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I. Introduction 
Over the course of nine months ending in early 2013, MPHJ 
Technology Investments, LLC (MPHJ) sent over sixteen thousand 
letters to small businesses throughout the United States.1 MPHJ 
chose these businesses from a commercial database with the 
intent to target employers of fewer than one hundred 
individuals.2 The letters claimed that each business was “likely” 
infringing MPHJ’s patents covering the use of a scanner to send 
documents over a network to a computer.3 After receiving very 
few responses, MPHJ’s attorney sent a second round of letters 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Complaint at 18, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, No. 6:14-cv-11 
(W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 13, 2014) [hereinafter MPHJ Complaint] (“The essential 
message of this First Letter was an indication that MPHJ felt it likely that the 
recipient infringed, . . . .”). For a copy of a letter sent to Vermont businesses by 
MPHJ, see Complaint at Exhibit A, State v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 282-5-
13 Wncv (Vt. Super. Ct. filed May 8, 2013) [hereinafter Vermont Complaint], 
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/Vermont%20v%20MPHJ%20Technologies
%20Complaint.pdf. 
 2. See MPHJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 16 (describing MPHJ’s process of 
selecting which businesses to target).  
 3. See id. at 9–11 (describing MPHJ’s patent claims, common methods of 
infringement, and suggested remedies). 
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demanding that the businesses prove noninfringment, enter a 
licensing agreement, or face potential litigation.4 Still receiving 
little response, the attorney sent more letters threatening that “if 
we do not hear from you within two weeks from the date of this 
letter, our client will be forced to file a Complaint against you for 
patent infringement.”5 Rather than respond to MPHJ’s threats, 
many businesses complained to state attorneys general, which 
provoked state6 and federal investigations of MPHJ’s campaign.7  
A heated debate exists regarding whether patent-assertion 
campaigns, like MPHJ’s demand-letter campaign, are—on the 
one hand—legal uses of federally created patent rights or—on the 
other—abusive business practices.8 The issue is before Congress, 
where many patent reform bills have recently been introduced.9 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. at 20–21 (describing the second round letters).  
 5. Id. at 22. For a copy of a second round letter sent by MPHJ, see 
Vermont Complaint, supra note 1, at Exhibit B. For a copy of a draft complaint 
that MPHJ’s attorney sent to Vermont businesses, see Vermont Complaint, 
supra note 1, at Exhibit C. On November 19, 2013, MPHJ filed its first and only 
infringement suit against a letter recipient, a market research and “digital data 
collection” company. Complaint ¶ 8, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. Research Now, 
Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00962, 2013 WL 6684224 (E.D. Tex. filed Nov. 19, 2013). 
 6. See MPHJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that several state 
attorneys general were investigating MPHJ).  
 7. See id. (“[T]he FTC Defendants followed the trend of the Attorney 
Generals [sic], and served a subpoena on MPHJ.”). 
 8. See infra Part II.B (describing the dialectic).  
 9. See Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 3349, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) 
(proposing the establishment of a revolving fund for the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office supported by its collected fees that “shall be available for 
use by the Director without fiscal year limitation”); Patent Transparency and 
Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (focusing on 
end-user protection including protection from demand letters sent in bad faith); 
Demand Letter Transparency Act, H.R. 3540, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) 
(proposing the creation of a national database to which patent holders must 
submit their letters and creating minimum letter content requirements); End 
Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (requiring 
disclosure of patent owners and real parties in interest); Patent Litigation and 
Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (requiring that 
civil actions alleging patent infringement include details of the infringing 
product, how the product infringes, and information about the patent and 
patentee); Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2014) (proposing the establishment of minimum requirements for notice of 
patent infringement); Patent Fee Integrity Act, S. 2146, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2014) (proposing creation of a revolving fund for the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office supported by the fees it collects); Trade Protection Not Troll 
Protection Act, H.R. 4763, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (proposing amendments 
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In the summer of 2013, state legislators entered the debate when 
Vermont passed a first-of-its-kind law prohibiting “bad faith” 
patent assertions.10 Despite criticism that federal law governs 
patent rights and preempts states from regulating patent 
assertions in this way,11 on February 25, 2014, Oregon followed 
Vermont’s lead by unanimously passing a structurally and 
substantively similar law.12 By September 2014, fourteen other 
states had passed laws modeled on Vermont’s regulation of bad-
faith patent assertions.13  
                                                                                                     
to the law that governs which companies can assert patent infringement within 
the International Trade Court so as to limit PAEs’ ability to seek relief before 
that tribunal); see also Jeffrey C. Morgan, Do Patent Trolls Have a Future?, FED. 
LAW., Oct.–Nov. 2013, at 46, 48–49 (summarizing pending patent reform bills). 
 10. See Act of July 1, 2013, No. 44, § 6, 2013 Vt. Legis. Serv. 44 (West) 
(codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–99 (2013)) (creating a private cause of 
action for businesses that are victim to bad-faith assertions of patent 
infringement); Peter Kunin, Vermont Approves Legislation Prohibiting Bad 
Faith Patent Infringement Claims, THE IP STONE (May 23, 2013), 
http://theipstone.com/2013/05/23/vermont-approves-legislation-prohibiting-bad-
faith-patent-infringement-claims (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (explaining the 
impetus for the Vermont law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. See Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First Anti-Patent 
Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/eric 
goldman/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/ 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“[D]ue to federal preemption doctrines, states 
cannot enact their own patent laws, and that preemption principle may apply to 
this law.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mike Masnick, 
Vermont Declares War on Patent Trolls: Passes New Law and Sues Notorious 
Patent Troll, TECHDIRT (May 23, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20130523/10255023186/vermont-declares-war-patent-trolls-passes-new-law-sues-
notorious-patent-troll.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (agreeing with Goldman 
that “a state-based solution is neither a good idea for this, nor is it probably 
legal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see T. Christian 
Landreth, The Fight Against “Patent Trolls:” Will State Law Come to the 
Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE EDITION 100, 120–25 (2014) (arguing that 
the Vermont law’s bad-faith standard is consistent with the federal standard 
necessary to avoid preemption). 
 12. S.B. 1540, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014), available at 
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2014R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1540/En 
rolled; see also Bryan Denson, “Patent Trolling” Bill Hailed by Oregon Attorney 
General as it Passes in Legislature, OREGONLIVE (Feb. 25, 2014, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/02/patent_trolling_bill_hailed_
by.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (summarizing the passage and contents of 
the Oregon law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See infra note 61 (listing states with bad-faith assertion laws).  
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By regulating patent assertions, Vermont, Oregon, and the 
replica state laws14 test a very fine line between a patent holder’s 
right to exclude others from infringing its patents and a state’s 
consumer protection obligation.15 That line is drawn by the 
federal preemption doctrine. Federal law protects a patent 
holder’s right to promote its patents in good faith.16 The Vermont 
law purports to respect this right by only regulating bad-faith 
patent assertions, as identified by a list of factors that courts may 
use as evidence of bad faith.17 This Note argues that several 
elements of the Vermont law’s concept of bad faith fall short of 
the federal bad-faith standard, causing the law to cross the line 
into patent-use regulation that is preempted by federal law.18  
This Note is not the first to reach the conclusion that parts of 
the Vermont law may be preempted, but it is the first to identify 
which specific provisions are preempted in light of current federal 
patent-law jurisprudence.19 By comparing the Vermont law’s 
definition of bad faith to the current federal patent-law concept of 
                                                                                                     
 14. This Note principally refers to the Vermont law because the Oregon law 
and the pending state bills mirror the structure and much of the substance of 
the Vermont law. See infra Part III (describing the structure of the Vermont and 
Oregon laws and the replica state bills).  
 15. See infra Part V.B (describing the federal patent law preemption 
standard in the patent promotion context).  
 16. See infra Part V.B.1 (describing the federal protection of patent 
promotions).  
 17. See infra Part VI.B (describing the Vermont law’s concept of bad faith 
in detail).  
 18. See infra Part VI.B.3 (identifying the elements of the Vermont law 
argued to be preempted).  
 19. See Landreth, supra note 11, at 126 (“[W]hile Vermont’s new statute 
lays out several factors that may lead a court to conclude that an assertion 
attempt is objectively baseless, it is unclear how many, and to what degree, 
these factors must be present for a court to make such a finding.”); Camilla A. 
Hrdy, What is Happening in Vermont? Patent Law Reform from the Bottom Up, 
PATENTLYO (May 27, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/what-is-
happening-in-vermont-patent-law-reform-from-the-bottom-up.html (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2014) (arguing that the Vermont law is not necessarily preempted, “so 
long as courts apply the law in a way that satisfies the Federal Circuit’s 
standard for a finding of ‘bad faith’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Justin McCabe, High Hurdle for State Laws to Curtail Patent Troll 
Activities, GREEN MOUNTAIN IP (Apr. 30, 2013), http://greenmountainip.com/ 
high-hurdle-for-state-laws-to-curtail-patent-troll-activities/ (last visited Sept. 24, 
2014) (arguing that some sections of the law safely avoid preemption while 
others are likely preempted) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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bad faith, this Note may guide judges interpreting bad-faith 
assertion laws, businesses hoping to bring suit under these laws, 
and, legislators in the states currently considering adopting 
similar laws.20 
To determine the proper relationship between state and 
federal regulation of the patent system, it is first helpful to 
identify the patent uses that states are attempting to regulate. To 
that end, Part II introduces the players in the patent ecosystem.21 
Part III describes the Vermont and Oregon bad-faith patent 
assertion laws and similar state bills.22 To assess whether state 
bad-faith patent-assertion legislation is preempted by federal 
patent law, Parts IV and V develop the general doctrine of federal 
preemption and its specific application to patent law.23 Part VI 
applies this preemption analysis to the Vermont law to reach the 
conclusion that much of the law is likely dead letter because it is 
preempted by federal patent law.24 Part VII argues that the 
inoperability of the law is normatively justified, especially in light 
of the potential value of preempted law, described in Part VIII.25 
II. The Patent Ecosystem 
A. Participants in the Patent Ecosystem 
Patent-assertion campaigns like MPHJ’s are only one of 
many potential strategies for patent use.26 More generally, a 
patent grants the patent holder a property right,27 which includes 
the right to exclude others from infringing on that property.28 The 
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Part VI.B (conducting a detailed preemption review of the 
Vermont law).  
 21. Infra Part II. 
 22. Infra Part III.  
 23. Infra Part III–IV.  
 24. Infra Part V.  
 25. Infra Part VII. 
 26. See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The 
Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) 
(identifying at least twelve categories of patent actors).  
 27. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, 
patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).  
 28. See id. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
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patent grant serves the Patent Act’s29 purpose of promoting 
invention while preserving competition.30  
Broadly speaking, there are two classes of patent holders: 
practicing entities and nonpracticing entities.31 Practicing 
entities are companies that produce a product or technology 
related to their patents.32 Nonpracticing entities, by contrast, 
employ their patents by selling them, licensing them for fees, or 
asserting them for infringement damages.33 Although 
nonpracticing entities are not per se problematic to the patent 
system,34 some commentators view them as abusive because they 
are often “focused on the enforcement, rather than the active 
development or commercialization of their patents.”35 A member 
of this group of nonpracticing entities is referred to as a patent 
assertion entity (PAE), or pejoratively as a patent troll.36 This 
                                                                                                     
infringement of his patent.”); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property: 
A Fundamental But Important Concept, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 88–89 (2009) 
(discussing the exclusion right inherent in personal property and patents).  
 29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376. 
 30. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964) 
(“Thus the patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are 
carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free 
competition.”).  
 31. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The 
Complex Patent Ecosystem and its Implications for the Patent System, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 297, 320–32 (2010) (dividing her analysis of the patent ecosystem 
along lines of practicing and nonpracticing entities). 
 32. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 26, at 11 (describing a practicing company 
as a “patent owner that actually makes products”). 
 33. See Daniel P. McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. 
Patent System, SCI. PROGRESS, Fall & Winter 2008–2009, at 80–81 (describing 
patent use strategies in the “Patent Troll Realm”).  
 34. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (“Firms 
that aggregate and manage patents can play an important intermediary role, 
bringing value to society by more efficiently matching inventors to patent users 
in an otherwise illiquid market, and by developing expertise in legitimately 
protecting patents from infringement.”). 
 35. Chien, supra note 31, at 328.  
 36. See Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: 
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent 
Reform Act of 2005 and eBay v. MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
431, 431 (2008) (“[P]atent trolls are individuals or corporations that hoard 
patents for the sole purpose of collecting licensing fees and damage awards from 
patent infringement suits, rather than their intended purpose—protection of an 
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vivid characterization is based on PAEs’ familiar practice of 
unexpectedly surfacing to demand infringement payment from 
manufacturing companies for a patented invention that the troll 
neither practices nor developed.37 To avoid the prejudicial term 
“patent troll” and to distinguish among the many legitimate 
nonpracticing entity business strategies,38 this Note refers to 
nonpracticing entities that engage in the aggressive litigation and 
licensing of patents as a principal source of revenue as PAEs.39 
                                                                                                     
exclusive, profitable technology.”); James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the 
Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea 
Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 189 (2006) (“A patent troll is a person or entity 
who acquires ownership of a patent without the intention of actually using it to 
produce a product. Instead, the patent troll buys the patent and either licenses 
the technology . . . or it sues . . . .”). Allegedly, former assistant general counsel 
for Intel Corp. Peter Detkin coined the term “patent troll” after he was sued for 
libel for referring to the same bad actors as “patent extortionists.” See Brenda 
Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER (S.F., 
Cal.) (July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf (interviewing 
Detkin).  
 37. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls 
and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1819–22 (2007) 
(finding evidence of “patent sharks” demanding royalty payments from farmers 
allegedly infringing dormant design patents in the post-Civil War era); Chien, 
supra note 31, at 311–12 (finding roots of modern PAE strategies in independent 
inventor Jerome Lemelson’s success at licensing his inventions to large 
manufacturers for fees totaling well over one billion dollars in the 1980s and 
1990s); Klint Finley, World’s Most Innovative Patent Troll Sues the Government, 
WIRED (Jan. 15, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2014/01/mphj-
ftc-patent/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“It’s no surprise when a patent troll sues 
a big tech company like Apple and Google. We’ve grown accustomed to these 
tiny outfits that use their patents solely to attack other, wealthier operations.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. Although the choice of characterization is contentious, this use of 
terminology is consistent with other commentators. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 
26, at 10 (identifying twelve categories of patent plaintiffs, only one of which is a 
practicing entity).  
 39. See S.B. 1563, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (N.J. 2014), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S2000/1563_I1.HTM (last visited Sept. 
24, 2014) (“Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs, also commonly known as ‘patent 
trolls’) . . . focus on aggressive litigation . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
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B. The Patent-Assertion Entity Dialectic 
A fervent debate exists between critics and proponents of 
PAEs, with each side accusing the other of supporting its position 
with anecdotal, or less than anecdotal, evidence.40 Those who 
argue against PAEs can point to recent studies noting huge 
private and social losses of wealth associated with PAE 
lawsuits,41 damaging effects on innovation, and increased product 
costs as manufacturers pass the threat of litigation on to 
consumers through higher prices.42 Defenders of PAEs see the 
patent-assertion business model as a viable use of a federally 
granted property right and a natural step in the progression to an 
idea economy.43 They argue that PAEs act as patent-market 
makers by increasing demand for patents, make patents more 
easily transferable, and provide new revenue sources for 
inventors.44 Defenders also argue that patent-market stimulation 
increases liquidity for failed startups that have patents as 
                                                                                                     
 40. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 26, at 2 (“Far too much of this debate is 
based on anecdote and assumption, not real data.”). 
 41. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE 
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (estimating a direct accrued 
costs to patent-assertion defendants of $29 billion in 2011 from suits brought by 
nonpracticing entities); James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of 
Patent Trolls, REG., Winter 2011–2012, at 26, 31 (finding a mean loss of public 
company value of $120 million per patent infringement lawsuit as measured by 
decreased stock value). But see H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 20–21 n.15 (2013) 
(referring to the $29 billion figure as likely based on a sample size prone to 
selection bias). 
 42. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae 
in eBay v. MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1009 (2005) (“[T]hese 
costs (as well as legal defense fees) [are] eventually passed on to consumers—
leading to economic deadweight loss—but in addition innovation may suffer 
because some companies will refrain from introducing certain products for fear 
of hold-up.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 43. See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 36, at 218–20 (arguing that PAEs 
serve a valuable function that has advanced the economy).  
 44. See id. at 211–18 (arguing that NPEs positively alter patent market 
dynamics); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis 
of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 145–46, 150 (2010) (finding 
empirical evidence that NPEs promote innovation by identifying and acquiring 
high-value patents). But see Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 457, 491 (2012) (agreeing that NPEs facilitate patent markets, but 
questioning whether those markets actually promote invention and social 
value). 
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assets.45 Perhaps the most compelling argument in support of 
PAEs is that they act as valuable resources for independent 
inventors that lack the skill, scale, or sophistication to effectively 
commercialize their inventions.46 
Within the dialectic, the sharpest criticism of the PAE 
business strategy is aimed at those entities that attempt to assert 
patents against end users, rather than manufacturers.47 For 
example, one PAE notoriously filed infringement lawsuits against 
coffee shops, restaurants, department stores, and hotel chains for 
offering customers common Wi-Fi services.48 Even one self-
described “patent troll” objects to the practice of pursuing 
infringement claims against end users.49 End users and 
consumers can be particularly vulnerable to PAE abuses because 
they often lack the resources to properly assess the validity of a 
threat of patent infringement.50 The Vermont law principally 
                                                                                                     
 45. See John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture 
Capital-Funded Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170, 171–72 
(2006) (finding that increased liquidity in the patent market has “increased the 
attractiveness of using technology transfer as an exit strategy”). But see Risch, 
supra note 44, at 493 (“[I]f NPEs are supposed to be a source of post-failure 
liquidity in order to encourage venture funding, then they are doing a seemingly 
poor job of it in practice.”). 
 46. See McDonough, supra note 36, at 209–12 (arguing that without PAEs, 
inventors and small entities would not have the clout to effectively enforce their 
patents).  
 47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 26–28 (2013) (recording 
congressional testimony rebuking infringement suits brought against 
consumers).  
 48. See Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands 
to Corporate Hotels, PAT. EXAMINER (Sept. 30, 2011), http://patent 
examiner.org/2011/09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-corporate-
hotels/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing this PAE’s “infringement suit 
rampage”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49. “Notorious Patent Troll” Supports 10 out of 12 of the White House’s 
“Anti-Troll” Measures, IPNAV BLOG (June 6, 2013), http://www. 
ipnav.com/blog/e2809cnotorious-patent-trolle2809d-supports-10-out-of-12-of-the-
white-housee28099s-e2809canti-trolle2809d-measures/ (last visited Sept. 24, 
2014) (“As long as the consumer has not modified the product, the manufacturer 
is the one that should be held liable, not the consumer.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 50. See Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., A.G. 
Schneiderman Announces Groundbreaking Settlement with Abusive “Patent 
Troll” (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
announces-groundbreaking-settlement-abusive-%E2%80%9Cpatent-
troll%E2%80%9D (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (explaining that PAE campaigns 
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aims to regulate the bad-faith assertion of patent infringements 
against these end users.51  
III. State Bad-Faith Assertion Legislation 
The Vermont statute addresses a narrow class of actors 
within the patent ecosystem, entities that assert patent 
infringement in bad faith against Vermont businesses and 
citizens.52 The main substantive provision of the statute states 
that a “person shall not make a bad-faith assertion of patent 
infringement.”53 Rather than define bad faith directly, the statute 
provides a nonexclusive list of factors that a court may consider 
as evidence of bad faith or lack thereof.54 Part VI analyzes those 
factors in detail.55 The legislature codified a statement of the act’s 
purpose, which includes the desire to help Vermont businesses 
avoid expenses associated with bad-faith patent assertions 
“without conflicting with federal law.”56  
Seemingly motivated by similar concerns, many other states 
have taken notice of Vermont’s law.57 On February 25, 2014, 
Oregon became the second state to directly regulate bad-faith 
patent assertions by unanimously passing a bill modeled on the 
Vermont law.58 The speed with which the Oregon legislature 
                                                                                                     
aimed at end users often succeed because “smaller businesses often do not have 
the experience or resources needed to fully evaluate the patents”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 51. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(6) (2013) (“[A] business that receives 
a letter asserting such claims faces the threat of expensive and protracted 
litigation and may feel that it has no choice but to settle and pay a licensing fee, 
even if the claim is meritless.”).  
 52. See id. § 4195(b) (describing the “narrow focus” of the bad-faith 
assertion law).  
 53. Id. § 4197.  
 54. See id. § 4197(b)–(c) (listing factors that a court may consider as 
evidence of good or bad faith).  
 55. Infra Part VII.  
 56. Tit. 9, § 4195(a)(4).  
 57. See Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont Could Save the Nation from Patent 
Trolls, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/how-vermont-could-save-the-nation-from-patent-
trolls/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (noting that the law was untested as of 
August 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 58. See Denson, supra note 12 (describing the Oregon law).  
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passed this law was staggering; the bill went from the Senate 
floor to the signing desk in only twenty-four calendar days.59 The 
Oregon law follows the Vermont law’s structure by prohibiting 
bad-faith patent assertions and providing courts a list of potential 
indicators of good- or bad-faith assertions.60 By September 2014, 
fourteen more states had passed laws substantively and 
structurally similar to Vermont’s regulation of bad-faith patent 
assertions.61 By adopting the bad-faith standard developed in the 
Vermont law, large portions of these bills will be dead on arrival 
because they are preempted by federal patent law.62  
                                                                                                     
 59. See S.B. 1540 A, OREGON ST. LEGIS., https://olis.leg.state.or.us/ 
liz/2014R1/Measures/Overview/SB1540 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing 
the history of the bill’s passage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 60. See Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 19, §§ 1–5 (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 646.605–.652); Denson, supra note 12 (summarizing the passage and contents 
of the Oregon law). 
 61. S.B. 121, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2014) (enacted Mar. 18, 
2014), http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACTIONViewFrameMac.asp? 
TYPE=Substitute&AMDSUB=157933-3&DOCNAME=157933-3.pdf&DOCPATH= 
searchableinstruments/2014RS/Printfiles&INST=SB121; Act of Mar. 26, 2014, ch. 
277, §§ 1–2 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701 to -1708); S.B. 143, 
2014 Gen. Assemb., 88th Sess. (S.D. 2014) (enacted Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://legis.sd.gov/docs/legsession/2014/Bills/SB143S.pdf; Act of Apr. 1, 2014, ch. 
310, §§ 1–5 (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1901 to -1904); Act of 
Apr. 14, 2014, ch. 543 (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 757); Act of 
May 1, 2014, ch. 879, § 1 (to be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-40-101 to -
104); Act of May 5, 2014, ch. 307, (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§§ 11-1601 to -1605); H.B. 2837, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2014) (enacted May 
16, 2014), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/2013-14%20INT/hB/HB2837% 
20INT.PDF; Act of May 23, 2014, ch. 819 (to be codified at VA. CODE. ANN. 
§§ 59.1-215.1 to -215.4); Act of May 28, 2014, ch. 297, § 1 (to be codified at LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1428); Act of July 1, 2014, ch. 513, §§ 1–2 (to be codified at 
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-770); Act of July 11, 2014, ch. 197, §§ 1–3 (codified as 
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 359-M:1–5 (2014)); S.B. 706, 97th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014) (enacted Aug. 28, 2014) (codified as amended at 
MO. REV. STAT. § 416.650–.658 (2014)); Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, No. 098-1119 
(Aug. 26, 2014) (to be codified at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2RRR (2014). 
Additionally, Wisconsin passed a law that requires patent holders to include 
specified information in infringement notifications, but does not prohibit 
expressly prohibit bad-faith patent assertions. Act of Apr. 23, 2014, ch. 339 (to 
be codified at WIS. STAT. § 100.197). 
 62. See infra Part VI.B.3 (describing those provisions of the Vermont law 
that are likely preempted by federal patent law).  
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IV. Federal Preemption Law Generally 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution63 states that 
the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the 
Land.”64 The Supreme Court articulated the meaning of this 
clause in Gibbons v. Ogden,65 when Chief Justice John Marshall 
said that if state law is “opposed to, or inconsistent with, any 
constitutional power which Congress has exercised, then, so far 
as the incompatibility exists, the [state] grant is nugatory and 
void, necessarily by reason of the supremacy of the law of 
Congress.”66 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause to 
preempt state law in three general contexts: explicit preemption, 
field preemption, and conflict preemption.67 When Congress 
includes a statement in a statutory scheme that makes federal 
law the exclusive authority, state regulation in the area is 
explicitly preempted.68 When no explicit preemption provision 
exists, courts may find that federal law impliedly preempts state 
law through field or conflict preemption.69 Field preemption 
exists when Congress enacts a legislative scheme so pervasive 
that it occupies the regulatory field, leading to the reasonable 
inference that Congress intended to exclude state regulation in 
that field.70 Conflict preemption, by comparison, exists when a 
state law directly interferes with a federal law.71 Conflict 
                                                                                                     
 63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 66. Id. at 30. 
 67. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (describing the 
three categories of preemption). 
 68. See, e.g., Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 
(2012) (“No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be 
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of 
this chapter.”). 
 69. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(“Absent explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types of 
implied pre-emption: field pre-emption . . . and conflict pre-emption . . . .”). 
 70. See id. (defining field preemption). 
 71. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (“[S]tate law is pre-empted to the extent 
that it actually conflicts with federal law.”). 
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preemption can occur when it is impossible to simultaneously 
comply with both state and federal law,72 or when state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objective of Congress.”73 The Court has 
acknowledged that the boundaries of these three categories are 
not rigidly drawn, which can cause ambiguous distinctions in the 
case law.74 
Two principles guide the preemption analysis. First, respect 
for federalism requires that preemption analysis begin with the 
presumption that Congress does not “cavalierly” preempt state 
law.75 This presumption is particularly strong when Congress 
legislates in a field traditionally within the state police powers.76 
Second, preemption analysis is fundamentally a determination of 
congressional purpose.77 Statements of express preemption 
present the most obvious analysis of congressional purpose 
because the purpose is embodied in the statute’s text.78 Inferring 
Congress’s intent to impliedly preempt state regulation is more 
demanding because it requires an examination of the statute’s 
language, structure, and inherent objective.79 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. (“[T]he court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements . . . .”).  
 73. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 74. See id. at 79 n.5 (“By referring to these three categories, we should not 
be taken to mean that they are rigidly distinct.”). 
 75. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 76. See id. 
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress 
has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the states have traditionally 
occupied,’ we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 77. See id. (“[O]ur analysis of the scope of the statute’s pre-emption is 
guided by our oft-repeated comment, . . . that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (“Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of 
congressional intent . . . .”). 
 78. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (“[W]hen Congress has made its intent 
known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.”). 
 79. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (“To 
discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the 
structure and purpose of the statute.”). 
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has assessed the congressional objective underlying federal 
patent law in the preemption context on several occasions.80 
V. Federal Preemption in Patent Law 
Congressional authority to establish a patent system 
originates from the enumerated power of Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.81 Under this authority, 
Congress passed the first federal patent statute in 1790.82 After 
several iterations, the modern Patent Act83 developed from the 
Patent Act of 1952.84 Unlike the Copyright Act’s85 explicit 
preemption language stating that “no person is entitled to any 
such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any State,”86 the Patent Act contains 
no explicit preemption provision.87 The Supreme Court, however, 
has found that federal patent law impliedly preempts state law in 
several instances.88 
                                                                                                     
 80. See infra Part V (describing the Supreme Court’s analysis of federal 
patent law’s preemptive effect).  
 81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).  
 82. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; see also Frank D. Prager, 
Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 309, 320–24 (1961) (providing a legislative history of the first patent act). 
 83. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012); see also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the 
New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 163–70 (1993) 
(providing a history of the development of federal patent law and a legislative 
history of the 1952 Act).  
 84. See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 30–31 (2d 
ed. 2006) (recounting the historical development of U.S. patent law).  
 85. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805. 
 86. Id. § 301.  
 87. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (excluding an express preemption provision); 
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“Because federal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit 
preemption, we of course agree with the district court that there is no 
preemption on this ground.”).  
 88. See infra Part V.A (describing the Supreme Court’s patent preemption 
case law).  
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A. Implied Preemption of State Law 
The Supreme Court has concluded that state attempts to 
grant patent-like protection to unpatentable inventions can 
conflict with the objectives of federal patent law.89 These 
Supreme Court decisions do not directly control whether states 
can regulate patent assertions or bad-faith assertions, but they do 
identify patent law’s objectives.90 These objectives are important 
because implied preemption analysis is “fundamentally a 
question of congressional intent.”91  
The Supreme Court addressed the potential conflict between 
state unfair competition law and federal patent law in two cases 
decided on March 9, 1964.92 In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co.,93 the Court considered whether the manufacturer of an 
unpatented “light pole” could use Illinois’s unfair competition law 
to obtain an injunction and damages against a company selling a 
nearly identical product.94 Similarly, in Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc.,95 a manufacturer of fluorescent light fixtures 
sought to use the same Illinois law against a competitor that 
copied the manufacturer’s light fixture design.96 The Court began 
its preemption analysis in Sears by stating that federal patent 
law would preempt state attempts to protect intellectual property 
                                                                                                     
 89. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (describing cases in which 
the Supreme Court found state law preempted by federal patent law); Caroline 
Marsili, Note, The Preemptive Power of Federal Patent Law: A Framework for 
Analyzing State Antitrust Challenges to Pay-for-Delay Settlements, 14 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 849, 864–870 (2013) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the preemptive effect of federal patent law to determine if federal 
law preempts state antitrust laws).  
 90. See Hunter, 153 F.3d at 1333 (looking to Supreme Court precedent to 
“set forth the essential criteria—the ‘objectives of the federal patent laws’—for 
determining whether there is field or conflict preemption”). 
 91. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 
 92. See infra notes 93–106 and accompanying text (describing these cases).  
 93. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 94. See id. at 225–26 (“The question in this case is whether a State’s unfair 
competition law can, consistently with the federal patent laws, impose liability 
for or prohibit the copying of an article which is protected by neither a federal 
patent nor a copyright.”). 
 95. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 96. See id. at 234–35 (stating the factual background of the case). 
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in a manner inconsistent with federal patent law.97 The Illinois 
law created an intellectual property right in nonpatentable 
products, like the light pole and light fixtures, because it allowed 
manufacturers to exclude others from replicating those 
products.98 Creating this property right conflicted with several 
federal patent law objectives.99  
One patent law objective is to promote innovation by 
granting an exclusive right to use an invention for a limited 
period of time.100 By limiting the period of exclusive use, patent 
law seeks to increase the amount of new knowledge that becomes 
available for public use after a patent has expired.101 Patent law 
also retains general knowledge in the public domain by imposing 
strict standards on the class of inventions that can be granted 
rights of exclusive use.102 By prohibiting the copying of 
unpatentable light poles and light fixture designs, the Illinois law 
effectively granted a right of exclusive use to the 
manufacturers.103 This exclusionary power removed inventions 
from the public domain that federal law dictated should remain 
available for public use.104 This conflict with an objective of 
federal patent law resulted in the preemption of Illinois’s unfair 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 (“Obviously a State could not, consistently 
with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent 
beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of 
invention required for federal patents.”). 
 98. See id. at 232–33 (describing the lower court’s application of Illinois’s 
unfair competition law as granting a patent-like protection to nonpatentable 
inventions). 
 99. See id. at 229–32 (identifying federal patent law’s objectives).  
 100. See id. at 229 (“Patents . . . are meant to encourage invention by 
rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the 
patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.”). 
 101. See id. at 230 (describing the tradeoff between a grant of exclusion and 
eventual public disclosure of knowledge). 
 102. See id. (noting the adherence to strict standards for patentable 
inventions). 
 103. See id. at 231 (discussing the effect of the Illinois law).  
 104. See id. at 231–32 (“To prevent the copying of an article which 
represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to 
block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the 
public.”); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) 
(“To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy . . . of allowing free 
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the 
public domain.”). 
2040 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2023 (2014) 
competition law as applied to the facts in Sears105 and Day-
Brite.106  
The Court continued this reasoning in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,107 by finding that federal law 
preempted a Florida law that prohibited the use of a “direct 
molding process” to replicate an unpatented boat design.108 The 
Court’s conflict preemption analysis reiterated that the removal 
of an unpatented process from the public domain “constrict[s] the 
spectrum of useful public knowledge,”109 “erod[es] the general 
rule of free competition upon which the attractiveness of the 
federal patent bargain depends,”110 and “impermissibly 
contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which 
is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.”111 
In Bonito Boats, the Court extended the preemption analysis 
of Sears and Day-Brite one step further. The Court found that 
federal patent law preempted the field that the Florida law 
sought to regulate.112 The Florida law aimed at “promoting 
intellectual creation by substantially restricting the public’s 
ability to exploit ideas.”113 Problematically, this is “a field of 
regulation which the patent laws have reserved to Congress.”114 
As such, federal law preempted the Florida law that prohibited 
the replication of unpatented designs through an unpatented 
process.115 
                                                                                                     
 105. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) 
(finding the Illinois law preempted). 
 106. See Day-Brite, 376 U.S. at 239 (“Since the judgment below forbids the 
sale of a copy of an unpatented article and orders an accounting for damages for 
such copying, it cannot stand.”). 
 107. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  
 108. See id. at 168 (finding the Florida law preempted). 
 109. Id. at 159.  
 110. Id. at 161.  
 111. Id. at 157.  
 112. See id. at 167 (“The patent statute’s careful balance between public 
right and private monopoly to promote certain creative activity is a ‘scheme of 
federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 168 (finding the Florida law preempted by federal patent 
law).  
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Although these cases could be read to substantially foreclose 
states from regulating intellectual property,116 the Court 
discouraged such a broad interpretation by noting that states 
have leeway to create some intellectual property rights.117 
Federal patent law, for example, does not preempt state creation 
of trade secrets118 or regulation of trade dress.119 
These cases identify the objectives of the federal patent 
system that inform an implied preemption analysis.120 Federal 
patent law seeks to promote the “Progress of Science”121 through 
fostering and rewarding invention.122 Patent law promotes 
innovation by granting limited exclusive property rights in 
exchange for the public disclosure of the invention.123 That 
                                                                                                     
 116. See id. at 154 (“Read at their highest level of generality, [Sears and 
Day-Brite] could be taken to stand for the proposition that the States are 
completely disabled from offering any form of protection to articles or processes 
which fall within the broad scope of patentable subject matter.”). 
 117. See id. (“That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle 
from Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself.”). 
 118. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 492 (1974) (“Neither 
complete nor partial pre-emption of state trade secret law is justified.”). When 
finding that states can protect trade secrets, the Court looked beyond trade 
secret law’s purpose of encouraging invention. Id. at 481–82. The Court 
acknowledged that trade secret law also sought to maintain “standards of 
commercial ethics.” Id. Ultimately, the Court found that trade secret law is not 
preempted because it has a distinguishable purpose from federal law and 
because it provides an additional incentive for invention that does not remove 
information from the public domain or obfuscate disclosure. See id. at 484–92 
(explaining why trade secret law is not preempted by federal patent law).  
 119. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 
(1989) (“Trade dress is, of course, potentially the subject matter of design 
patents. Yet our decision in Sears clearly indicates that the States may place 
limited regulations on the circumstances in which such designs are used in 
order to prevent consumer confusion as to the source.”). 
 120. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Although this quintet of cases does not decide the preemption 
issue on appeal here, it sets forth the essential criteria—the ‘objectives of the 
federal patent laws’—for determining whether there is field or conflict 
preemption.”).  
 121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 122. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (acknowledging the constitutional powers 
that motivated Congress’s passage of the patent laws). 
 123. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157 (describing the eventual disclosure of 
inventions to the public as “the centerpiece of federal patent policy”); Kewanee, 
416 U.S. at 480 (describing the incentives generated by federal patent law); 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (“Patents . . . are 
meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited 
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promotion, however, is carefully balanced with the maintenance 
of free competition.124 Balance is maintained by strictly limiting 
those inventions which are patentable in a uniform way, thereby 
retaining unpatentable inventions within the public domain for 
public benefit.125  
B. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Preemption 
Standard 
Rather than create additional protections for intellectual 
property that might implicate Supreme Court conflict 
precedent,126 the Vermont law limits the potential uses of a 
patent.127 The prevailing standards for evaluating state 
regulation of patent use come from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) because the Supreme Court 
has not considered the issue.128 Although the regional circuit 
courts previously employed their own federal patent preemption 
                                                                                                     
to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his 
invention.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 753–54 (2012) (proposing that the incentive of a patent accelerates 
innovation). But see Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing 
to Patent War, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891, 1944–47 (2012) (finding evidence in 
a historical case study of the light bulb that the patent system could harm 
innovation in the long run). 
 124. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 230–31 (identifying objectives of federal patent 
law). 
 125. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) 
(acknowledging this patent law objective).  
 126. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In Dow Chemical, we understood the Supreme Court 
precedent to preempt state laws that ‘seek to offer patent-like protection to 
intellectual property inconsistent with the federal scheme.’” (quoting Dow 
Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).  
 127. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(2) (2013) (“The General Assembly 
does not wish to interfere with the good faith enforcement of patents or good 
faith patent litigation.”); Tim Wu, How to Make War on Patent Trolls, THE NEW 
YORKER (June 3, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/ 
06/how-to-make-war-on-patent-trolls.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (quoting 
Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell as saying that the Vermont law is 
“not anti-patent,” but rather “anti-abuse of patent rights”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 128. See Hunter, 153 F.3d at 1333 (identifying the limited guidance of 
Supreme Court precedent when considering preemption of state business tort 
claims). 
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analysis, that power now squarely resides with the Federal 
Circuit, which has appellate jurisdiction over patent matters.129 
Applying Federal Circuit preemption standards adds uniformity 
and stability to the interpretation of federal patent law.130 
In its preemption analysis, the Federal Circuit has found 
that by passing the patent laws, Congress did not intend to 
occupy the field of state unfair competition law.131 The Patent Act 
occupies the field of granting patents, while state unfair 
competition laws occupy the field of commercial marketplace 
interactions, such as everyday business transactions.132 Thus, 
state unfair competition laws are not preempted through field 
preemption.133 Declining to find field preemption in this context 
has the effect of limiting state tort preemption analysis to a case-
by-case determination, rather than facially preempting the state 
laws.134 In other words, if state laws regulating patent use are 
preempted, they will be preempted as applied.135 
State tort laws could conflict with federal patent law if the 
state law is applied to interfere with “conduct that is protected or 
governed by federal patent law.”136 One important area of conduct 
that federal patent law protects is the good-faith assertion or 
                                                                                                     
 129. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (adopting Federal Circuit law as the governing standard for 
preemption analysis). 
 130. See id. at 1360 (“In order to fulfill our obligation of promoting 
uniformity in the field of patent law, it is equally important to apply our 
construction of patent law to the questions whether and to what extent patent 
law preempts or conflicts with other causes of action.”). 
 131. See Hunter, 153 F.3d at 1333 (finding no “clear and manifest purpose” 
of Congress to preempt state unfair competition law). 
 132. See id. at 1334 (distinguishing between federal patent law and state 
unfair competition law). 
 133. See id. at 1333 (“Because of the lack of such congressional intent, in 
conjunction with the underlying presumption disfavoring preemption, there is 
no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial 
question of federal patent law.”).  
 134. See id. at 1335 (“As the Supreme Court noted, a state law is not per se 
preempted unless every fact situation that would satisfy the state law is in 
conflict with federal law.”).  
 135. See id. (limiting the potential preemption of state tort laws to 
“instances when the application of state law would could conflict with federal 
law” rather than finding facial preemption). 
 136. Id. 
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promotion of patents.137 The Vermont law problematically seeks 
to regulate patent assertions, albeit those made in bad faith.138 
Defining what constitutes a federally protected patent promotion 
establishes the patent uses that states cannot regulate without 
conflicting with federal law.139 After the following section 
describes that boundary, Part VI.B argues how Vermont law 
treads upon the regulation of patent promotion that is protected 
by federal law.140 
1. The Right of Patent Promotion 
The Patent Act grants that a “patentee shall have remedy by 
civil action for infringement of his patent.”141 Inherent in that 
infringement remedy is the patent holder’s power to “make its 
rights known to a potential infringer so that the latter can 
determine whether to cease its allegedly infringing activities, 
negotiate a license if one is offered, or decide to run the risk of 
liability.”142 This patent promotion right is protected by federal 
patent law.143 Federal law would preempt a state law that 
conflicts with this right.144 Federal patent law, however, does not 
protect bad-faith patent promotion.145 Because it is beyond the 
                                                                                                     
 137. See id. at 1336 (identifying patent promotion and inequitable conduct 
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as two areas protected by federal 
patent law); Peter J. Wied, Patently Unfair: State Unfair Competition Laws and 
Patent Enforcement, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 479–87 (1999) (summarizing the 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit patent law preemption analysis and 
identifying conduct protected by patent law).  
 138. See infra Part VI.B (describing why the Vermont bad faith factor is 
problematic on preemption grounds).  
 139. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“If a plaintiff bases its tort action on conduct that is 
protected or governed by federal patent law, then the plaintiff may not invoke 
the state law remedy, which must be preempted for conflict with federal patent 
law.”). 
 140. See infra Part VI.B (applying the federal preemption standard to the 
Vermont bad faith factors).  
 141. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). 
 142. Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
 143. See id. (defining the promotion right).  
 144. See Hunter, 153 F.3d at 1335–37 (explaining conflict preemption). 
 145. See id. at 1336 (“[F]ederal patent law bars the imposition of liability for 
publicizing a patent in the marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the 
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protection of federal law, states can regulate bad-faith patent 
promotion without implicating federal preemption.146 Even state 
laws that do not require bad faith as an element may be used to 
regulate patent promotion if bad faith is proven in addition to the 
elements of the state claim.147 
The Vermont law prohibits bad-faith patent assertions, 
which could fall outside of the protection of federal law.148 Bad 
faith, however, is a term of art in the Vermont law and in federal 
jurisprudence.149 Furthermore, “a party attempting to prove bad 
faith on the part of a patentee enforcing its patent rights has a 
heavy burden to carry.”150 Patents are presumed to be valid151 
and patent promotion is presumed to be in good faith.152 To rebut 
these presumptions, a party must demonstrate bad faith in 
accordance with the federal standard,153 which is significantly 
more onerous than the concept of bad faith that the Vermont law 
develops.154 
                                                                                                     
patent holder acted in bad faith.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“In [Hunter Douglas] we opined that there is no conflict-type 
preemption of various state law claims based on publicizing an allegedly invalid 
and unenforceable patent in the marketplace as long as the claimant can show 
that the patent holder acted in bad faith in publication of the patent.”). 
 147. See id. (“[T]o avoid patent law preemption of such state law tort claims, 
bad faith must be alleged and ultimately proven, even if bad faith is not 
otherwise an element of the tort claim.”). 
 148. See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2013) (prohibiting bad-faith 
assertions of patent infringement).  
 149. See infra Part V.B.2 (describing the federal bad-faith standard).  
 150. 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 151. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The 
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on 
the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 152. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“The law recognizes a presumption that the assertion of a duly granted patent 
is made in good faith; this presumption is overcome by affirmative evidence of 
bad faith.”). 
 153. See infra Part V.B.2 (describing the federal bad-faith standard).  
 154. See infra Part VI.B.3 (describing the portions of the Vermont law that 
are likely preempted).  
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2. The Federal Bad-Faith Standard 
Protecting good-faith patent promotion is justified by a 
patent holder’s First Amendment right to petition the 
government and federal preemption doctrine.155 In Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,156 
the Court considered whether the act of petitioning government 
officials to enact legislation could be regulated by the federal 
antitrust laws because of the anticompetitive effect that 
legislation would have.157 The Court reasoned that “[t]he right of 
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and 
we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to 
invade these freedoms.”158 Based on that reasoning, the Court 
found that federal antitrust law did not limit the constitutionally 
protected freedom to petition the legislature.159 The Court 
subsequently extended the Noerr immunity beyond petitioning 
the political branches to petitions for government redress through 
litigation.160 Thereafter, regional circuit courts and the Federal 
Circuit broadly applied Noerr immunity to patent holders by 
treating prelitigation patent promotions as akin to court 
petitions.161 This means that asserting patent rights through a 
demand letter or cease-and-desist letter is constitutionally 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Our decision to permit state-law tort liability for 
only objectively baseless allegations of infringement rests on both federal 
preemption and the First Amendment.”). 
 156. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).  
 157. See id. at 136 (considering whether federal antitrust law prohibited an 
agreement to lobby for legislation that was intended to harm a competitor).  
 158. Id. at 138.  
 159. See id. at 135 (finding that federal antitrust liability “cannot be 
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of 
laws”). 
 160. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 
(1972) (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the 
Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the 
right of petition.”).  
 161. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur sister circuits, almost without exception, 
have applied the Noerr protections to pre-litigation communications.”).  
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protected in a manner similar to petitions directly to the 
legislature or the courts.162 
Noerr immunity, however, does not protect government 
petitions that are a “mere sham to cover what is actually nothing 
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.”163 For over thirty years, the lower 
courts developed varying definitions of sham litigation,164 until 
the Court clarified that petitions are not shams unless they are 
objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith.165 A 
petition is objectively baseless when “no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.”166 Under this 
standard, even scurrilous and malintentioned government 
petitions aimed at damaging a competitor are protected by the 
Noerr doctrine if the legal viability of the lawsuit is not 
objectively baseless.167 
To continue its interpretation that patent promotions are a 
form of government petition, the Federal Circuit incorporated the 
objective baselessness requirement into its bad-faith preemption 
standard.168 Thereafter, litigants attempting to employ state law 
to regulate prelitigation patent promotion, such as demand 
letters, must prove both objective baselessness and subjective bad 
faith.169 This two-prong analysis is not novel to determining 
                                                                                                     
 162. See id. at 1376–77 (describing the constitutional rationale for protecting 
prelitigation patent assertions).  
 163. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127, 144 (1961). 
 164. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 55 n.3 (1993) (summarizing the standards applied by the federal 
courts of appeals).  
 165. See id. at 57 (“We now . . . hold that an objectively reasonable effort to 
litigate cannot be sham regardless of subjective intent.”).  
 166. Id. at 60.  
 167. See id. at 59 (“[W]e have repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of 
anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot transform otherwise legitimate 
activity into a sham.”); Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 
891, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] competitive commercial purpose is not of itself 
improper, and bad faith is not supported when the information is objectively 
accurate.”). 
 168. See Globetrotter, Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1367, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing the adaptation of the Noerr doctrine 
to patent infringement suits).  
 169. See 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“This ‘bad faith’ standard has objective and subjective components.”).  
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whether state laws survive preemption review.170 The Federal 
Circuit requires proving objective baselessness and subjective bad 
faith when a patent holder seeks enhanced damages for “willful 
infringement.”171 Similarly, prior to the 2014 Supreme Court 
decision of Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,172 
Federal Circuit precedent did not permit infringement 
defendants to recover attorney’s fees unless the defendants 
satisfied the same objective baselessness and subjective bad-faith 
elements, or the case involved material inappropriate conduct.173 
Although defining “[e]xactly what constitutes bad faith remains 
to be determined on a case by case basis,”174 Federal Circuit 
precedent from these areas provide substantial guidance on what 
factual scenarios could satisfy the objective-baselessness-plus-
subjective-bad-faith standard.175 Satisfying this standard is 
essential to the viability of the Vermont law because attempts to 
regulate patent promotions that do not meet the federal standard 
of bad faith are preempted.176 
a. The Objective-Baselessness Prong 
Federal Circuit interpretations of the objective-baselessness 
standard create a fuller picture of what it means to have no 
objectively realistic expectation of success on the merits.177 The 
                                                                                                     
 170. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993) (developing the “two-tiered process” that underlies 
several Federal Circuit standards).  
 171. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(distinguishing between the objective and subjective components necessary for a 
court to award enhanced damages). 
 172. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).  
 173. See id. at 1751 (holding that district courts can award fee shifting in 
patent cases without finding objective baselessness and subjective bad faith); 
iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The objective 
baselessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees against a non-
prevailing plaintiff . . . is identical to the objective recklessness standard for 
enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees against an accused infringer for § 284 
willful infringement actions . . . .”). 
 174. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 175. Infra Part V.B.2. 
 176. See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (describing the federal 
protection of good-faith patent promotions).  
 177. Cf. Landreth, supra note 11, at 124 n.148 (“Globetrotter does not outline 
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Federal Circuit ruled that a district court had not found objective 
baselessness when the district court stated that “it cannot be said 
that either one side or the other will prevail on the ultimate 
issues.”178 The district court further failed to find objective 
baselessness when it stated that allegation of infringement 
presented a “close question” and that “the patent is not 
necessarily invalid and the court could not conclude that there 
was no infringement.”179 These statements illustrate the difficulty 
of proving that a reasonable patent holder could not have a 
realistic expectation of success, except in those instances when 
the patents are “obviously invalid or plainly not infringed”180 or 
the “claims of infringement were factually unsound.”181 Satisfying 
the objective baselessness threshold is made even more 
demanding by courts’ practice of evaluating the objective merits 
of a claim before considering and without any reference to the 
subjective intent of the patent holder.182 A court will proceed to 
consider the subjective bad faith of the patent holder only after 
finding objective baselessness.183 
b. The Subjective Bad-Faith Prong 
Subjective bad faith exists when the party threatening or 
initiating legal action is not motivated by a “subjective 
expectation of success” in the underlying litigation.184 For 
                                                                                                     
what kind of evidence would suffice to make a finding of objective baselessness, 
simply saying that the Plaintiff did not attempt to make such a showing.”). 
 178. GP Indus., Inc. v. Eran Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 181. Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 
1264 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 182. See GP Indus., 500 F.3d at 1375 (“Subjective considerations of bad faith 
are irrelevant if the assertions are not objectively baseless.” (quoting Prof’l Real 
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993))). 
 183. See, e.g., Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp., 529 F.3d 1334, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[O]nce the court concludes that the claims of infringement are 
objectively baseless, the court must then consider whether the claims were 
made in subjective bad faith.”).  
 184. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
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example, accusing a competitor of patent infringement while the 
competitor is contemplating a business acquisition could 
demonstrate the patent holder’s intent to frustrate the pending 
deal rather than its intent to win the infringement suit.185 Some 
believe that the PAE business model is built around a subjective 
intent to avoid litigation rather than win infringement suits.186 
Common PAE practices of pricing licenses below the cost of 
defending an infringement suit and asserting patents against 
unsophisticated parties support this argument.187 Even if the 
PAE business strategy is not inherently an indicator of subjective 
bad faith, accused infringers have several other methods of 
demonstrating that a PAE is not motivated by success on the 
merits of an infringement claim.188  
The clearest proof of subjective bad faith comes from direct 
evidence that a patent holder asserted a patent “with knowledge 
of [the infringement allegation’s] incorrectness or falsity, or 
disregard for either.”189 Recently, however, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that finding direct evidence of a patent holder’s 
state of mind is akin to “essentially requiring the discovery of a 
smoking gun.”190 The difficulty of producing direct evidence that a 
patent holder knew or should have known that its claim was 
baseless proved to be too onerous a burden.191 Perhaps in an 
effort to prevent Congress or the Supreme Court from interfering 
with patent jurisprudence,192 the Federal Circuit recently 
                                                                                                     
U.S. 49, 57 (1993).  
 185. See Globetrotter, 362 F.3d at 1375 (using this example of subjective bad 
faith).  
 186. See Morgan, supra note 9 (noting this belief).  
 187. See id. (describing PAE practices aimed at avoiding litigation on the 
merits); see, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (finding evidence of subjective bad faith in a patent holder’s filing of 
many infringement suits followed “with a demand for a quick settlement at a 
price far lower than the cost to defend the litigation”). 
 188. See infra notes 190–98 and accompanying text (describing how 
subjective bad faith can be demonstrated).  
 189. Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
 190. Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
 191. See id. (“Lack of direct proof of subjective bad faith should not alone 
free a party from the threat of assessment of attorney’s fees under § 285.”). 
 192. See Ryan Davis, Fed. Cir. Fee Ruling Arms Foes of “Patent Troll” Bills, 
LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/498167/fed-
FACING DOWN THE TROLLS 2051 
broadened the acceptable methods of demonstrating subjective 
bad faith to permit a consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances.193 Potential indicators of subjective bad faith 
within this inquiry could include “failure to conduct an adequate 
pre-suit investigation, vexatious or unduly burdensome litigation 
tactics, misconduct in procuring the patent, or an oppressive 
purpose.”194  
Several of these circumstantial indicators resemble the bad-
faith factors included in the Vermont law.195 But even under this 
loosened standard, several of the Vermont bad-faith factors are 
inoperable because they demonstrate only subjective bad faith 
and fail to incorporate objective considerations.196 Before 
describing why much of the Vermont law conflicts with federal 
patent protections, the following subpart argues why the 
Vermont law is not field preempted by federal patent law.197 
VI. Analyzing the Vermont Law Under the Federal Preemption 
Standard 
A. Federal Law Does Not Preempt the Field of Bad-Faith Patent 
Assertion Legislation 
The Patent Act preempts the limited field of the “creation 
and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in 
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice 
                                                                                                     
circ-fee-ruling-arms-foes-of-patent-troll-bills (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (noting 
that the loosening subjective bad-faith standard could be an effort to preempt 
federal patent-reform bills and pending Supreme Court cases that could impose 
new standards for awarding attorneys’ fees) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 193. See Kilopass, 738 F.3d at 1311–12 (ruling that a finding of objective 
baselessness should weigh heavily in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of 
whether the claim was made in subjective bad faith). 
 194. Id. at 1311.  
 195. See infra Part VI.B (analyzing the Vermont bad-faith factors in depth).  
 196. See Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“[T]o the extent that the district court did not require actual knowledge of 
objective baselessness, it erred.”); infra Part VI.B.3 (arguing that several of the 
Vermont factors are likely preempted).  
 197. Infra Part VI.A.  
2052 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2023 (2014) 
the invention for a period of years.”198 State consumer protection 
and unfair competition laws, by contrast, regulate in the field of 
marketplace interactions.199 The Federal Circuit distinguished 
these two fields by ruling that “there is no reason to believe that 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress was for federal patent 
law to occupy exclusively the field pertaining to state unfair 
competition law.”200  
Despite this seemingly clear precedent, the Vermont law is 
arguably distinguishable from general consumer protection 
laws.201 The Vermont law aims to exclusively regulate patent 
assertions, whereas general consumer protection laws prohibit 
“[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in commerce.”202 Although the form of 
the Vermont law more directly implicates the field of patent 
creation than generalized statutes, the substance of the law is 
only a particularized instance of the state’s consumer protection 
function.203 The law grants the attorney general the same 
rulemaking and remedial authority that he possesses under the 
state’s consumer protection chapter, which is meant to 
“complement the enforcement of federal statutes . . . in order to 
protect the public and encourage fair and honest competition.”204 
Viewed in this light, courts should find that the Vermont law, like 
other state consumer protection and unfair competition laws, is 
not field preempted by federal patent law.205  
                                                                                                     
 198. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 
(1989). 
 199. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1334 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Both the Supreme Court and this court have 
distinguished between the two fields in which federal patent law and state 
unfair competition law operate.”). 
 200. Id. at 1333.  
 201. Cf. Landreth, supra note 11, at 121–25 (concluding that the Vermont 
law avoids federal preemption without considering the question of field 
preemption).  
 202. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2013). 
 203. See id. § 4199(a) (granting the attorney general the same authority 
under the bad-faith assertion law as under the general consumer-protection 
statute); Lee, supra note 57 (interviewing a drafter of the Vermont law).  
 204. Id. § 2451; see also id. § 4199(a) (describing the attorney general’s 
authority under the bad-faith assertion law). 
 205. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no field preemption in the application of state tort 
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Recent federal patent reforms did not alter the field 
regulated by federal law in a way that would create preemption 
concerns for the Vermont law.206 In September 2011, Congress 
passed the America Invents Act (AIA),207 which “arguably makes 
the most substantial changes to the law since those imposed by 
the Patent Act of 1836.”208 The primary goal of the reform was to 
“[i]mprove the application process by transitioning to a first-
inventor-to-file system; improve the quality of patents issued by 
the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office] . . . ; and provide more 
certainty in litigation.”209 The AIA legislative history indicates 
that concern about abusive patent assertions partially motivated 
the adoption of reforms limiting the joinder of defendants in 
infringement litigation and changing the review rules for 
business-method patents.210 Yet the sparse mentions of PAEs 
within the legislative history fall short of demonstrating 
Congress’s clear and manifest intent to exclude state regulation 
of bad-faith patent assertions.211 Field preemption does not exist 
where such a clear and manifest demonstration is absent.212 
                                                                                                     
laws, including California’s unfair competition act, negligence, international 
interference with prospective economic advantage, and negligent interference 
with prospective economic advantage).  
 206. See, e.g., Sukumar v. Nautilus, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 386, 395 (W.D. Va. 
2011) (arguing unsuccessfully that the AIA “altered the Patent Act so 
substantially that it evinces the intent of Congress to completely occupy the 
field of false marking law”). 
 207. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).  
 208. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents 
Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435 (2012).  
 209. 157 CONG. REC. S131 (Jan. 25, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 210. See id. (“Patents of low quality and dubious validity . . . enable patent 
trolls and constitute a drag on innovation. Too many dubious patents also 
unjustly cast doubt on truly high quality patents.”); Joe Matal, A Guide to the 
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 
590–93, 626–27 (2012) (finding references to “patent trolls” within the compiled 
legislative history of the AIA). 
 211. See Wes Klimczak, IP: How the AIA has Affected Patent Litigation: Part 
Two of a Guide to Approaching the New Patent System, INSIDE COUNS. (June 18, 
2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/06/18/ip-how-the-aia-has-affected-
patent-litigation (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (finding pretrial joinder operations 
under the AIA to be very similar to pretrial operations prior to the passage of 
the AIA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 212. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (describing the 
“clear and manifest purpose” standard necessary to infer field preemption of a 
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By describing the field preemption doctrine as a “blunt tool,” 
the Federal Circuit has demonstrated a preference for analyzing 
potential preemption under a case-by-case conflict preemption 
analysis.213 The following subpart applies that analysis to find 
that much of the Vermont law and similarly modeled patent-
assertion laws are likely inoperable because they conflict with 
federal patent law.214 
B. The Vermont Law Conflicts with Federal Patent Law 
As described in Part V.B, federal patent law protects patent 
holders’ good-faith patent assertions.215 This protection relegates 
states to regulating patent assertions shown to be made in bad 
faith.216 The Vermont statute purports to adhere to this standard 
by prohibiting only a “bad faith assertion of patent 
infringement.”217 Rather than define bad faith directly, the 
Vermont law provides a nonexclusive list of factors that a court 
may consider as evidence of bad faith, including: 
(1) The demand letter does not contain the following 
information: (A) the patent number; (B) the name and address 
of the patent owner or owners and assignee or assignees, if 
any; and (C) factual allegations concerning the specific areas 
in which the target’s products, services, and technology 
infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent. 
(2) Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to 
conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the 
target’s products, services, and technology, or such an analysis 
was done but does not identify specific areas in which the 
products, services, and technology are covered by the claims in 
the patent. 
                                                                                                     
field traditionally regulated by the states).  
 213. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing conflict preemption as a “better choice” 
than field preemption to analyze whether a state unfair competition law is 
preempted by federal patent law).  
 214. Infra Part VI.B.  
 215. Supra Part V.B.2. 
 216. Supra Part V.B.2.  
 217. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197 (2013). 
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(3) The demand letter lacks the information described in 
subdivision (1) of this subsection, the target requests the 
information, and the person fails to provide the information 
within a reasonable period of time. 
(4) The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or 
response within an unreasonably short period of time. 
(5) The person offers to license the patent for an amount that 
is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the 
license. 
(6) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, 
and the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or 
assertion is meritless. 
(7) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive. 
(8) The person or its subsidiaries or affiliates have previously 
filed or threatened to file one or more lawsuits based on the 
same or similar claim of patent infringement and: (A) those 
threats or lawsuits lacked the information described in 
subdivision (1) of this subsection; or (B) the person attempted 
to enforce the claim of patent infringement in litigation and a 
court found the claim to be meritless.218 
Despite the Vermont law’s expressed respect for federal 
patent law,219 several of these bad-faith indicators do not meet 
the federal bad-faith standard, which requires objective 
baselessness and subjective bad faith.220 Thus, several of the 
Vermont factors cannot independently serve as indicators of bad 
faith without violating a patent holder’s federally protected right 
to assert its patent.221 Only one factor independently satisfies the 
                                                                                                     
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. § 4195(a)(3) (“The General Assembly does not wish to interfere 
with the good faith enforcement of patents or good faith patent litigation. The 
General Assembly also recognizes that Vermont is preempted from passing any 
law that conflicts with federal patent law.”).  
 220. See supra Part V.B.2 (describing the objective and subjective bad-faith 
concepts).  
 221. See Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 165 F.3d 891, 897 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It has long been recognized that ‘Patents would be of little 
value if infringers of them could not be notified of the consequences of 
infringement or proceeded against in the courts. Such action considered by itself 
cannot be said to be illegal.’” (quoting Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 
U.S. 8, 37–38 (1913))); tit. 9, § 4195(a)(2) (“Patent holders have every right to 
enforce their patents when they are infringed, and patent enforcement litigation 
is necessary to protect intellectual property.”).  
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federal bad-faith standard.222 The following sections identify 
which factor clearly survives preemption review,223 which factor 
likely survives preemption review,224 and which factors are likely 
preempted.225 
1. The Vermont Factor That Survives Preemption Review 
Of the eight bad-faith factors listed in the Vermont law, only 
factor six independently satisfies the federal bad-faith 
standard.226 Factor six permits a finding of bad faith when a 
“claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the 
person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is 
meritless.”227 The Federal Circuit has found that “obviously, if the 
patentee knows that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed, yet represents to the marketplace that a competitor is 
infringing the patent, a clear case of bad-faith representation is 
made out.”228  
Factor six presents such a “clear case,” because it contains 
both the objective and subjective components of the bad-faith 
standard. Recall that objective baselessness exists when no 
reasonable patent holder “could realistically expect success on the 
merits.”229 Like reasonableness analysis in other tort contexts,230 
the actual patent holder’s knowledge is imputed onto the 
                                                                                                     
 222. See infra Part VI.B.1 (describing the factor that survives preemption 
review).  
 223. Infra Part VI.B.1. 
 224. Infra Part VI.B.2. 
 225. Infra Part VI.B.3. 
 226. See McCabe, supra note 19 (concluding that factors six, seven, and, 
arguably, eight contain criteria sufficient to satisfy the objective-baselessness 
standard). But see Landreth, supra note 11, at 124–25 (concluding that factors 
six and seven satisfy the objective-baselessness standard, but arguing that 
many of the other factors are sufficient as well). 
 227. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(7) (2013). 
 228. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 229. 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)).  
 230. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 280 (2000) (“The reasonable 
person . . . is said to have these attributes: . . . all the additional intelligence, 
skill, or knowledge actually possessed by the individual actor . . . .”). 
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reasonable patent holder.231 If the actual patent holder knew or 
should have known that its claim of infringement is meritless, the 
reasonable patent holder could not realistically expect success on 
the merits.232 Factor six mirrors this analysis by permitting a 
finding of bad faith if the claim is “meritless, and the person 
knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is 
meritless.”233 Because it incorporates objective baselessness 
through subjective knowledge of meritlessness, factor six would 
survive preemption review.  
2. The Vermont Factor That Might Survive Preemption Review 
Factor eight permits a court to find bad faith when the 
patent holder “has previously filed or threatened to file one or 
more lawsuits based on the same or similar claim of patent 
infringement and: . . . (B) the person attempted to enforce the 
claim of patent infringement in litigation and a court found the 
claim to be meritless.”234  
The presence of repetitive filings or repetitive threats to sue 
raises a threshold question of whether the two-step sham 
litigation exception even applies. The Ninth,235 Second,236 and 
Fourth237 Circuits narrowly read the Supreme Court’s two-step 
standard to apply only to single-suit shams. For repetitive filings, 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(considering whether the specific patent holder accused of bad-faith patent 
assertion had a reasonable basis to believe its patents were infringed).  
 232. See, e.g., Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1309–12 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing the objective and subjective implications of looking 
at what the patent holder knew or should have known about its claim). 
 233. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(7) (2013). 
 234. Id. § 4197(b)(8)(B) (emphasis added).  
 235. See USS-Posco Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between 
single actions and a “whole series of legal proceedings” for purposes of the Noerr 
sham litigation exception).  
 236. See PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 219 F.3d 92, 
101 (2nd Cir. 2000) (limiting its application of the two-step sham inquiry to 
single actions).  
 237. See Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 364 (4th Cir. 2013) (“We distinguish PREI 
because it is ill-fitted to test whether a series of legal proceedings is sham 
litigation.”).  
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however, these circuits consider whether “the legal challenges 
‘are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings 
without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a 
market rival.’”238 The Federal Circuit has recognized the potential 
for a distinct test to assess whether repetitive filings are shams, 
but has never deviated from the two-step objective baselessness 
and subjective bad faith standard.239 Even if the Federal Circuit 
was to adopt a distinct repetitive-filing exception, the alleged 
infringer would still have to demonstrate that the patent holder 
filed “simultaneous and voluminous” actions against it.240 Since 
the Federal Circuit has never endorsed nor applied a distinct 
repetitive suit sham definition, this Note considers the bad faith 
factor eight under the standard two-step test. As shown below, 
this factor is likely preempted, but could comply with the 
objective-baselessness standard in limited circumstances.241 
The question of objective baselessness posed by this factor is 
whether a reasonable patent holder whose prior assertion of 
infringement was found to be meritless could realistically expect 
to succeed in a later case. Commentator T. Christian Landreth 
answers this question in the negative, finding that “no reasonable 
litigant could expect success on the merits of a claim that has 
already been dismissed as meritless in the past.”242 This factor, 
however, is subject to at least two interpretations that have 
opposite implications for preemption analysis. 
First, the factor’s reference to a prior “claim” dismissed as 
meritless could refer to the statements on a patent application 
that define the “subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”243 A claim in this sense states “the metes and bounds 
of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude 
                                                                                                     
 238.  PrimeTime 24, 219 F.3d at 101. 
 239. See ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“On these particular facts . . . we need not determine 
whether to adopt the test of our sister courts because there is no ‘series’ of legal 
proceedings.”).  
 240.  See id. at 1292 (concluding that the patent holder’s filing of three 
relevant lawsuits against the alleged infringer was not sufficiently to “implicate 
a test for ‘a whole series of legal proceedings’”).  
 241. See McCabe, supra note 19 (concluding that this provision possibly 
satisfies the objective-baselessness standard, but that it “would be a stretch”). 
 242. Landreth, supra note 11, at 125. 
 243. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).  
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others from making, using or selling the protected invention.”244 
In other words, a claim “defines the propriety boundaries of the 
invention.”245 Under this interpretation, a prior court 
determination that the patent holder’s defined boundaries of its 
patent claims are meritless could defeat its ability to 
subsequently realistically believe that the same claim could be 
infringed.246 But claim construction is “not always an exact 
science, and it is not unusual for parties to offer competing 
definitions of even the simplest claim language.”247 Thus, even a 
prior baseless claim interpretation may not necessarily indicate 
that a subsequent similar claim interpretation is objectively 
baseless.248  
Under a second likely interpretation, “claim” could mean “the 
aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a 
court” or the complaint itself.249 Oregon’s new law avoids the 
Vermont law’s ambiguity by adopting this second 
interpretation.250 Oregon replaced the word “claim” with 
“complaint,” defined as a document filed with an adjudicative 
body or sent to another party to initiate a judicial proceeding.251 
Under Oregon’s definition, a court may find evidence of bad faith 
                                                                                                     
 244. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
 245. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 3 (2000). 
 246. See e.g., iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(looking to a patent’s prosecution history to determine if a subsequent claim was 
objectively baseless).  
 247. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  
 248. See iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1379 (“Even when presented with ‘simple’ claim 
terms, courts may differ in their interpretation of those terms.”).  
 249. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009).  
 250. Compare VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(8)(B) (2013) (using the phrase 
“a court found the claim to be meritless”), with S.B. 1540, 77th Leg. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. § 2(2)(b) (Or. 2014), available at https://olis.leg.state.or.us/ 
liz/2014R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB1540/Enrolled (using the phrase 
“dismissed the complaint as frivolous”).  
 251. See Or. S.B. 1540, § 2(2)(b) (“A court, . . . dismissed the complaint as 
frivolous or without merit at any point during a proceeding before the court, the 
panel or the body.”). 
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if the patent holder previously brought a similar complaint and a 
court “dismissed the complaint as frivolous or without merit.”252  
By clarifying that its statute does not refer to “claim” in the 
patent claim sense, Oregon’s bad-faith factor is less ambiguous, 
but also less likely to satisfy the federal bad-faith standard. 
Under the Oregon interpretation, the objective-baselessness 
question becomes whether a prior court finding that a previous 
complaint was meritless means that “no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect to prevail” on a similar complaint.253 What a 
prior court finding of meritlessness communicates to the 
reasonable patent holder about its chances for success in a future 
complaint, however, is a highly fact-specific inquiry.254 It is 
imaginable that a finding of meritlessness could defeat a 
litigant’s realistic expectation of success if the court’s finding 
relates directly to the patent’s validity and the allegedly 
infringing products in the two cases are very similar.255 For 
example, no patent holder could realistically expect to prove 
infringement if a court previously found the patent had expired 
and the patent holder subsequently alleges infringement during 
the time the patent was known to be expired.256  
In the alternative, it is just as easy to imagine a court 
dismissing a complaint as meritless for reasons that do not relate 
to the objective validity of the patent or theory of infringement. A 
claim dismissed for a procedural error, such as insufficient 
service of process, would not affect the reasonable patent holder’s 
expectation of success in subsequent complaints. Neither would a 
substantive finding that product X does not infringe a patent 
                                                                                                     
 252. Id. § 2(4)(g)(B).  
 253. Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp., 529 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)).  
 254. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 708 (3d ed. 2005) (“Ultimately the meaning of 
repetitive claims presents a fact question, just as the question of substantive 
reasonableness itself.”).  
 255. See id. (“The fact that challenged claims are repetitive can be of great 
importance, especially if the first dismissal gave the claimant objectively sound 
reasons for thinking that the subsequent claim is without merit.”).  
 256. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(implying that asserting a patent that is known to be invalid would constitute 
bad faith).  
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necessarily destroy the reasonable patent holder’s expectation of 
success against product Y. Thus, the likelihood that factor eight 
survives preemption review is influenced by whether “claim” is 
interpreted as a patent claim or a general complaint.257 The 
justification for the prior court’s finding of meritlessness is also 
an important consideration. To the extent that dismissals of prior 
cases do not relate to the objective substance of a patent’s 
validity, reliance on those dismissals as evidence of bad faith 
would be preempted. 
3. Preempted Vermont Factors 
Factor six and possibly factor eight should survive 
preemption review because they require the court to evaluate the 
objective merits of the patent-assertion claim.258 Based on either 
of these factors, a court could reach the conclusion that no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect to succeed on the 
merits.259 Thus, those factors can independently satisfy the 
objective-baselessness standard.260 The remaining Vermont 
factors, however, do not relate to the objective merits of the claim 
of infringement.261 Thus, none of the remaining factors could 
individually or in conjunction satisfy the federal bad-faith 
standard without the plaintiff separately proving objective 
baselessness.262 These factors fail to carry the heavy burden of 
satisfying the federal bad-faith standard and would be 
preempted, if applied as written.263  
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra notes 243–50 and accompanying text (identifying different 
likely interpretations). 
 258. See supra Part VI.B.1–2 (arguing that factor six and possibly factor 
eight will survive preemption review).  
 259. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993) (defining the objective-baselessness standard).  
 260. See supra Part V.B.2.a (describing the objective-baselessness standard).  
 261. See infra Part VI.B.3.a–d (analyzing Vermont factors (b)(1), (b)(2), 
(b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), and (b)(7)).  
 262. Cf. Landreth, supra note 11, at 126 (“[W]hile Vermont’s new statute 
lays out several factors that may lead a court to conclude that an assertion 
attempt is objectively baseless, it is unclear how many, and to what degree, 
these factors must be present for a court to make such a finding.”). 
 263. See 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“[A] party attempting to prove bad faith on the part of a patentee 
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a. Deceptive Patent Assertions 
Factor seven permits a finding of bad faith if the “claim or 
assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.”264 Commentator 
Justin McCabe argues that this factor includes sufficient criteria 
for a court to find objective baselessness.265 A close reading, 
however, reveals that a deceptive assertion does not likely satisfy 
the objective-baselessness standard.266  
The Vermont legislature has defined what constitutes a 
deceptive act for particular industries,267 but did not define 
“deceptive” in the context of bad-faith patent assertions.268 In an 
effort to align themselves with other states and federal law,269 
Vermont courts interpret deceptive acts or practices in the 
consumer protection context to require three elements: (1) a 
representation likely to mislead consumers; (2) consumer 
interpretation of the representation must be reasonable under 
the circumstances; and (3) “the misleading representation was 
material in that it affected the consumer’s purchasing 
decision.”270 Applying these elements to the concept of deceptive 
patent assertions fails the objective-baselessness standard for at 
least two reasons.  
First, Vermont law evaluates deception from the wrong 
perspective. The objective analysis under the consumer protection 
concept of deception requires that the reasonable consumer would 
be misled.271 The objective-baselessness standard, however, 
                                                                                                     
enforcing its patent rights has a heavy burden to carry . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)); supra Part V.B.2.a (describing the objective-baselessness standard).  
 264. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(7) (2013). 
 265. See McCabe, supra note 19 (arguing that factor seven is consistent with 
federal court findings of objective baselessness).  
 266. See infra notes 271–83 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
deceptive-assertion factor).  
 267. See tit. 9, § 4724 (providing a long list of acts relating to banking and 
insurance that are deceptive). 
 268. See id. § 4196 (defining only two words in the chapter, neither of which 
is “deceptive”). 
 269. See Jordan v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 853 A.2d 40, 43 (Vt. 2004) (“We note 
that our construction of Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act takes into account 
interpretations of similar protections under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
and other state laws.”). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. at 44 (“Under the Act’s objective standard, a consumer 
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considers whether a reasonable patent holder could realistically 
expect success on the merits.272 This difference in perspective is 
important because, in the patent context, what the accused 
infringer—or customer—believes is irrelevant to whether the 
customer is liable for patent infringement.273 Patent infringement 
is a strict liability offense, meaning “innocent (i.e., unintentional 
or inadvertent) infringement is not a defense to a patent 
infringement claim.”274 In this way, focusing on the 
reasonableness of the wrong party in the patent-assertion action 
fails to address the threshold issue of objective baselessness.  
Second, the deception concept of materiality is insufficient to 
constitute objective baselessness because it does not relate to an 
issue central to the infringement claims.275 Under Vermont law, 
an act is materially deceptive if the act affected the consumer’s 
purchasing decision.276 Many representations in a demand letter 
could satisfy this materiality standard by causing an alleged 
infringer to negotiate a license or stop its alleged infringement.277 
Vermont identified several of these factors in its consumer-
protection complaint against MPHJ, including MPHJ’s 
overstatement of the value of the license, misrepresentation of 
the number of licenses previously granted, and claims that its 
licensing program “had received a positive response from the 
business community.”278  
                                                                                                     
establishes the first element if she proves that the representation or omission 
had the tendency or capacity to deceive a reasonable consumer.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp., 529 F.3d 1334, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (defining objective baselessness as “meaning no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect to prevail in a dispute over the infringement of 
the patent”). 
 273. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its 
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800–01 (2002) (finding 
that patent infringement is a strict liability tort, but that damages are not 
awarded until the infringer is put on notice).  
 274. Id. at 800.  
 275. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
903, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (requiring that misstatements be “sufficiently central” 
to the claims of infringement to make the “entire licensing campaign a sham”).  
 276. See Jordan v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 853 A.2d 40, 44 (Vt. 2004) (defining 
the Vermont concept of deceptive acts or practices).  
 277. See, e.g., infra note 278 and accompanying text (providing examples).  
 278. Vermont Complaint, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
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Defining materiality as those acts that influence consumer 
decisions, however, conflicts with the Noerr sham doctrine that 
underlies the bad-faith standard.279 That standard requires that 
“any misrepresentation exception to the doctrine should be 
limited to misrepresentations respecting the substance of the 
claim to show that the party’s litigation position had no objective 
basis.”280 Aligning itself with several circuits, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently rejected the 
argument that misrepresentations like those complained of in the 
Vermont complaint could render a demand letter a “sham” under 
the Noerr doctrine.281 The Federal Circuit, however, has not yet 
considered the proper interpretation of materiality in the patent 
preemption context.282 By conflicting with the Noerr conception of 
materiality and considering objective factors from the wrong 
perspective, however, the consumer-protection interpretation of 
deceptive conduct likely does not satisfy the objective-
baselessness standard.283 Thus, factor seven, if applied alone, 
would be preempted. 
b. Unreasonable Demands 
Factors number four and five permit a court to find evidence 
of bad faith based on the reasonableness of demands made within 
a demand letter.284 A court may find bad faith in a letter that 
                                                                                                     
 279. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1367, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing the doctrinal development of the 
objective-baselessness standard).  
 280. See id. at 1375 (applying Noerr immunity to prelitigation 
communications). 
 281. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
903, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (declining to find the sham exception satisfied by 
demand letter misrepresentations about the number of licenses granted under 
the patent, the value of licenses, and the number of patents held valid by a court 
or reexamination proceeding). 
 282. See id. at 921 (“The court has not found, and the parties do not cite, any 
case in which the Federal Circuit has addressed whether misstatements of only 
tangential relevance to an infringement claim can render the assertion of that 
claim in pre-suit demand letters an objectively baseless sham.”). 
 283. See supra notes 271–81 and accompanying text (identifying defects in 
the deceptive assertion factor).  
 284. See infra notes 285–86 (quoting the Vermont law’s reasonableness 
factors).  
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demands a response in an unreasonably short period of time285 or 
that offers an unreasonably priced license.286 Unreasonable 
demand letters are not indicative of objective baselessness for 
reasons similar to why deceptive demand letters fail to satisfy the 
objective standard.287  
First, the unreasonableness of a demand letter is not 
material to the issue of infringement.288 The request of an 
unreasonable license fee or demanding an unreasonably prompt 
response has no bearing on whether the allegation of 
infringement “presents a close question.”289 Sending an 
unreasonable demand letter may be abusive,290 but it does not 
mean that the question of infringement is any less “open to 
debate.”291 Second, this factor attempts to shift the burden from 
the accused infringer to the patent holder. Finding bad faith in 
the unreasonableness of the demand letter is akin to requiring 
the patent holder to prove good faith. But the accused infringer 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the reasonable patent 
holder could have had no realistic expectation of success on the 
merits.292 Because the unreasonableness of the demand letter 
does not affirmatively prove objective baselessness, even 
                                                                                                     
 285. See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(4) (2013) (“The demand letter 
demands payment of a license or fee or response within an unreasonably short 
period of time.”).  
 286. See id. § 4197(b)(5) (“The person offers to license the patent for an 
amount that is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”). 
 287. See supra Part VI.B.3.a (analyzing the Vermont law’s deceptive-
demands factor).  
 288. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
903, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (requiring that demand letter misrepresentations be 
“sufficiently central” to the claims of infringement for the misrepresentation to 
satisfy the sham doctrine). 
 289. GP Indus., Inc. v. Eran Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).  
 290. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 22–23 (2013) (providing industry witness 
testimony of the disruption caused by ambiguous or incomplete demand letters).  
 291. Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp., 529 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 292. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (placing the burden on the party attempting to prove bad 
faith). 
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unreasonable letters are protected by federal law from state 
regulation.293 
c. Insufficient Investigation 
Vermont factor two permits finding bad faith in the patent 
holder’s failure to compare patent claims with the allegedly 
infringing product or in the patent holder’s failure to identify 
specific instances of infringement.294 Although a direct 
comparison of patent claims to a product may be necessary to 
avoid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11295 sanctions,296 failure to 
investigate is not determinative of objective baselessness.297  
Asserting infringement without evidence does make it 
“difficult to see how reasonable litigants could possibly expect to 
prevail on the merits” and “casts doubt upon the asserter’s ability 
to make a successful claim.”298 Yet “doubt” and difficulty to 
                                                                                                     
 293. See supra Part V.B.1 (describing why state regulation of good-faith 
patent promotion is preempted).  
 294. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(2) (2013). 
 295. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c) (establishing the conditions for imposing 
sanctions for actions improperly brought before a court). 
 296. See Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In the context of patent infringement actions, we have 
interpreted Rule 11 to require, at a minimum that an attorney interpret the 
asserted patent claims and compare the accused device with those claims before 
filing a claim alleging infringement.”). The Federal Circuit has expressly 
declined to equate the bad-faith standard with the Rule 11 investigation 
standard. See Dominant Semiconductors, Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 
1254, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We have never stated that the Rule 11 standard is 
the same as the standard applied in the line of cases following Professional Real 
Estate and Globetrotter.”). Important in this determination was that Rule 11 
applies to court pleadings, whereas the bad-faith standard for demand letters 
applies to “pre-litigation infringement allegations.” Id. 
 297. See, e.g., Dominant, 524 F.3d at 1263–64 (finding that failures to 
investigate are “probative of subjective baselessness, but they do not help to 
show that a jury reasonably could find . . . objective baselessness”); Fisher Tool 
Co., Inc. v. Gillet Outilage, 530 F.3d 1063, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the 
Federal Circuit standard to find no bad faith because the patent holder “relied 
on its lawyers to draft the letters” after examining the patent and the alleged 
infringer’s product); GP Indus., Inc. v. Eran Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d 1369, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that lack of product examinations by a company 
president or an expert are “not convincing objective factors”). 
 298. Landreth, supra note 11, at 124–25. 
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foresee success do not mean that a claim is objectively baseless.299 
In clear language, the Federal Circuit has concluded that failure 
to conduct a sufficient analysis has “nothing to do with the issue 
of whether” infringement claims are “objectively baseless.”300 In 
Dominant Semiconductors v. OSRAM,301 the Federal Circuit 
considered an allegation of bad faith based on the patent holder’s 
failure to compare its patent claims to the alleged infringer’s 
product before the patent holder sent demand letters.302 The 
Federal Circuit stated that allegations of insufficient 
investigation “might be probative of subjective baselessness, but 
they do not help to show that a jury reasonably could find 
that . . . [the patent holder’s] infringement allegations were 
objectively baseless.”303 
The presumptions underlying a patent infringement claim 
may help justify this seemingly counterintuitive classification. 
Patents are presumed to be valid304 and patent assertions are 
presumed to be brought in good faith.305 Failure to investigate 
may indicate a lack of evidence of infringement,306 but it does not 
defeat the presumption that a patent is valid and that the claim 
of infringement is brought in good faith.307 It is not always 
                                                                                                     
 299. See infra notes 300–08 and accompanying text (arguing that 
investigation is not a prerequisite for avoiding objectively baseless infringement 
claims).  
 300. Dominant, 524 F.3d at 1264. 
 301. 524 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 302. See id. at 1263 (“[Dominant’s] focus in the district court and on appeal 
is on its contention that the [infringement letter] was based on inadequate 
research.”).  
 303. Id. at 1263–64. But see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 
1302, 1314–1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (calling into question whether the bad-faith 
standard for permitting awards of alleged infringers’ attorneys’ fees should be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence). 
 304. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The 
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on 
the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 305. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“The law recognizes a presumption that the assertion of a duly granted patent 
is made in good faith, this presumption is overcome by affirmative evidence of 
bad faith.”). 
 306. See Landreth, supra note 11, at 124–25 (considering this argument 
sufficient to establish objective baselessness).  
 307. See Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 
1254, 1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the alleged infringer’s burden in 
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necessary to compare patent claims with an allegedly infringing 
product to create a reasonable expectation of success.308 
Therefore, federal law would preempt factor two’s attempt to 
define bad faith exclusively based on a proven failure to 
investigate. 
d. Demand Letters with Insufficient Information 
Several Vermont factors permit courts to find bad faith from 
a patent holder’s failure to include sufficient information in a 
demand letter for a recipient to efficiently respond.309 PAEs use 
the tactic of providing sparse information in demand letters to 
limit the alleged infringer’s ability to investigate the merits of a 
claim of infringement, thus increasing the informational 
asymmetry that advantages PAEs in licensing negotiations.310 
The information-defect factors support Vermont’s desire to 
facilitate “the efficient and prompt resolution of patent 
infringement claims.”311 Despite that honorable intention, 
informational defects are not probative of objective 
baselessness.312 
As the previous subsection described, a patent holder need 
not present direct evidence of infringement in order to avoid the 
bad-faith standard.313 If the patent holder need not possess 
                                                                                                     
demonstrating objective baselessness).  
 308. See id. at 1264 (finding that the complexity of the product does not 
change the determination that lack of investigation indicates only subjective bad 
faith). 
 309. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2013).  
 310. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 22–23 (2013) (providing witness 
testimony before congressional committee that infringement pleading 
deficiencies limit the alleged infringers ability to investigate the infringement, 
to prepare a defense, and cause inefficient delays and expenses). 
 311. Tit. 9, § 4195(b). 
 312. See infra notes 313–17 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
informational-defect factors).  
 313. Supra Part VI.B.3.c; see also Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. 
OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he contention that 
there was no indication that [patent holder] had performed a sufficient analysis, 
though arguably relevant on the issue of subjective intent, had nothing to do 
with the issue of whether [patent holder’s] contentions were objectively 
baseless.”). 
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specific evidence of infringement, then it need not disclose that 
information to alleged infringers when asserting its patent right. 
Furthermore, the party attempting to prove bad faith bears the 
burden.314 Finding bad faith in the patent holder’s failure to 
include certain information in a demand letter essentially 
requires the patent holder to demonstrate good faith.315 Failing to 
include sufficient information in a letter for a recipient to respond 
may indicate subjective bad faith,316 but it does not help an 
alleged infringer carry the burden of demonstrating objective 
baselessness.317 Thus, the information-defect factors would 
conflict with the federal bad-faith standard if not accompanied by 
an independent showing of objective baselessness. 
Failure to include sufficient evidence for a letter recipient to 
respond, like the other factors in this section, may be relevant in 
a totality-of-the-circumstances consideration of subjective bad 
faith.318 But by emphasizing indicators of subjective, rather than 
objective, bad faith, Vermont chose the wrong prong on which to 
base its bad-faith definition.319 The Federal Circuit may be 
loosening the concept of subjective bad faith, but the objective-
baselessness prong remains a threshold element that the accused 
infringer must prove to avoid preemption.320 An attempt to use 
any of the purely subjective bad-faith factors without an 
attendant finding of objective baselessness would be preempted 
by federal patent law.321  
                                                                                                     
 314. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 
1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]o avoid preemption, ‘bad faith must be alleged 
and ultimately proven . . . .’” (quoting Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 
1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).  
 315. See, e.g., Dominant, 524 F.3d at 1263 (ruling that the patent holder “did 
not bear the burden of proving that it made its communications in good faith”). 
 316. See supra Part V.B.2.b (describing the subjective bad-faith standard). 
 317. See supra Part V.B.2 (describing the bad-faith standard).  
 318. See Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (listing conduct similar to several of the Vermont factors as evidence of 
subjective bad faith).  
 319. See McCabe, supra note 19 (arguing that the Vermont law would be 
stronger if it provided more emphasis on objective baselessness and required an 
objective-baselessness component for each factor).  
 320. See Kilopass, 738 F.3d at 1314 (broadening the subjective bad-faith 
standard but leaving the objective-baselessness standard intact). 
 321. See supra Part V.B.2.b (describing why regulating solely subjectively 
bad-faith assertions is preempted by federal law). 
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This conclusion would render many of the Vermont bad-faith 
factors inoperable, but it does not completely destroy the 
applicability of the law itself.322 The principal provision of the law 
prohibits only a “bad faith assertion of patent infringement.”323 A 
court could disregard those purely subjective factors and simply 
adopt the federal bad-faith standard.324 In this way, the law itself 
is not facially preempted because not “every fact situation that 
would satisfy the state law is in conflict with federal law.”325 A 
court could also resort to the subjective factors after separately 
finding objective baselessness.326 In this way, the law may not be 
applicable in the manner that its drafters intended,327 but it can 
still have an impact on the PAE business model and serve local 
businesses.328  
VII. States Should Not Define Bad Faith 
As argued above, many components of the Vermont law are 
likely inoperable because they conflict with federal law.329 In 
addition to this doctrinal preemption finding, preempting the 
Vermont law and other similarly structured state laws is also 
prudentially justified because the cost of applying the Vermont 
law as written outweighs the benefits.  
                                                                                                     
 322. See Hrdy, supra note 19 (concluding that the law is not necessarily 
preempted, depending on its application).  
 323. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2013).  
 324. See id. § 4197(b)(9), (c)(9) (permitting the court to consider any other 
factors it finds relevant); McCabe, supra note 19 (arguing that the law falters by 
deviating from the federal bad-faith standard, but that it is still applicable if 
that standard is satisfied). 
 325. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Designs, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 326. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“[B]ad faith must be alleged and ultimately proven, even if bad faith is 
not otherwise an element of the tort claim.”). 
 327. See Kunin, supra note 10 (identifying the prevention of aggressive 
demand-letter campaigns like MPHJ’s as a motivator for passing the Vermont 
law). 
 328. See infra Part VIII (describing the Vermont law’s applicability when 
interpreted consistently with the federal bad-faith standard).  
 329. See supra Part VI.B (identifying which Vermont factors likely are or 
likely are not preempted).  
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Permitting states to define bad faith without respect to 
federal precedent would permit states to establish divergent bad-
faith standards. State officials may argue that variant state 
standards benefit individual states by creating a “race to the 
top.”330 But different definitions of bad faith would upset 
Congress’s intent of creating a system “in which uniform federal 
standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the 
same time preserving free competition.”331 Altering the ways a 
patent holder may assert its patent alters the value and nature of 
the patent right itself.332 Reducing the value of a patent could 
discourage innovation by decreasing the incentive to obtain a 
patent.333 Differences in the patent holder’s right to assert its 
patents are already evidenced by the slight deviations in the bad-
faith standards developed by Vermont and Oregon.334 The 
proliferation of state laws will further complicate the value of a 
                                                                                                     
 330. Wu, supra note 127. Vermont legislators demonstrated their “race to 
the top” motivations by codifying their desire to “build an entrepreneurial and 
knowledge based economy. Attracting and nurturing small and medium sized 
internet technology (“IT”) and other knowledge based companies is an important 
part of this effort and will be beneficial to Vermont’s future.” VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 
9, § 4195(a)(1) (2013). 
 331. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964). But see 
Camilla A. Hrdy, Dissenting State Patent Regimes, 3 IPTHEORY 78, 90–97 (2013) 
(arguing for state patent creation as a viable alternative to federal patents); 
Hrdy, supra note 19 (identifying benefits from state patent experimentation, 
including laws tailored to local needs, mitigating federal consolidation of 
authority, and experimentation). 
 332. See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 
1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Patent rights are useful only if they can legally exclude 
others from the patented subject matter.”). But see Wu, supra note 127 (quoting 
Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell as distinguishing between patent-
rights regulation and patent-abuse regulation); Bernard Nash, Massachusetts 
Attorney General Martha Coakley Looks to Slay Patent Trolls, INSIDE COUNSEL 
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/01/28/massachusetts-
attorney-general-martha-coakley-look (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“It is not the 
patent process itself that AGs are focusing on[;] . . . our focus is the abuse of the 
system by bad actors.” (statement of Mass. Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley)) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 333. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 28, at 93 (“Absent the ability to 
assert patent property rights, fewer inventions will be patented and the public 
storehouse of knowledge will decrease without the public disclosure from those 
patents.”). 
 334. See, e.g., supra Part VI.B.2 (describing the preemption implications of 
the Vermont law using the word “claim” compared to the Oregon law’s use of the 
word “complaint”). 
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patent holder’s property right and upset the delicate balance 
pursued by federal patent law.335  
This risk to the federal patent system is made more 
unjustifiable when compared with the marginal benefits states 
gain from bad-faith assertion laws. Bad-faith assertion laws are 
largely redundant of existing authority created by state consumer 
protection and deceptive acts and practices statutes.336 The 
National Association of Attorneys General believes that attorneys 
general can enforce existing state consumer-protection laws 
against patent holders for the same acts that bad-faith assertion 
laws would regulate, including:  
making false or deceptive statements in demand letters; 
targeting large numbers of businesses with demand letters 
with little or no investigation about whether the targeted 
businesses are actually infringing; intentionally targeting 
small businesses that may not have the resources to dispute a 
claim; and threatening litigation when no litigation is 
planned.337  
The Vermont attorney general illustrated that abusive 
demand letter campaigns can be attacked through existing laws 
by filing suit against MPHJ under its existing statutes.338 The 
fact that attorneys general already have this authority makes the 
Vermont law largely symbolic.339  
                                                                                                     
 335. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 28, at 96 (considering the effect of 
PAEs and concluding that “[t]he weakening or limiting of property-based 
remedies for patent infringement is not justified due to countervailing policies”). 
But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 116 (1990) (“Federal law does not preempt all bad state 
laws, and the existence of a ‘balance’ in federal law does not mean that states 
must adopt the same policy.”). 
 336. See Vermont and Nebraska Attorneys General Take Patent Trolls Head 
On, NAAGAZETTE, http://www.naag.org/vermont-and-nebraska-attorneys-
general-take-patent-trolls-head-on.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing 
attorneys general’s existing authority to regulate bad-faith patent assertions) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 337. Id.  
 338. See Vermont Complaint, supra note 1, at 2 (bringing an action against 
MPHJ based on the attorney general’s authority to enforce the state’s unfair-
and-deceptive-acts-and-practices statutes). 
 339. The Vermont law does contain a defendant bond provision, which would 
require a patent holder to put forward a bond equal to treble the total of a “good 
faith estimate of the target’s costs to litigate the claims and amounts reasonably 
likely to be recovered” upon a showing of “a reasonable likelihood that a person 
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VIII. Inoperability Does Not Destroy the Law’s Ability to Combat 
PAEs 
Referring to the law’s value as symbolic is not meant to 
trivialize the potential application of the law, even if preempted. 
The preempted provisions may serve a valuable function merely 
by remaining in the statute books.340 The preempted factors could 
communicate to businesses that they have legal recourse for some 
of the demand letters they receive.341 Even if a business cannot 
determine if demand letters are objectively baseless, or is 
completely unaware of the objective-baselessness standard, the 
existence of the statute could prompt a demand-letter recipient to 
inform its attorney general.342 The attorney general might then 
be in a better position to investigate and bring legal action on 
behalf of a large number of letter recipients.343  
Because PAEs often rely on the lack of sophistication of small 
business owners to extract illegitimate licenses,344 better 
informing businesses of their rights could weaken the PAE 
business model.345 At least one federal reform bill embraces this 
concept by proposing small-business education programs as a 
                                                                                                     
has made a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement.” VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, 
§ 4198 (2013).  
 340. See William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 
379–82 (2013) (arguing that laws affect the social meaning of an activity and 
can stimulate behavioral changes through increasing the salience of the issue). 
 341. See Press Release, supra note 50 (hoping that settlement terms reached 
with MPHJ will influence the behavior of subsequent senders and recipients of 
demand letters in New York). 
 342. See McCabe, supra note 19 (arguing that the law would be stronger if it 
forced the attorney general to investigate demand letter complaints because it 
would allow the attorney general to discover more instances of objectively 
baseless demands).  
 343. See Wu, supra note 127 (finding attorneys general a more effective 
plaintiff in bad-faith assertion suits than small business owners); Lee, supra 
note 57 (“[I]f other states adopt anti-troll measures . . . sending out a thousand 
demand letters would trigger responses from dozens of state attorneys general, 
who do have the resources and expertise to fight back.”).  
 344. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 37, at 1823–24 (finding that nineteenth-
century patent sharks and modern PAEs succeed in extracting licenses because 
of the infringement defendant’s lack of sophistication). 
 345. See Lee, supra note 57 (describing the effect bad-faith assertion laws 
could have on the calculus underlying the PAE business model).  
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remedy to patent system abuses.346 If the effect of the statute is to 
decrease the likelihood that businesses respond to frivolous 
demand letters, then the PAE business model will be 
substantially weakened.347 In this way, the impact of the law is, 
ironically, not necessarily dependent on the operability of its 
provisions. 
IX. Conclusion 
Demand-letter campaigns like MPHJ’s predatorily target 
small businesses as a matter of strategy.348 The public outcry for 
protection from this practice is strong and multiple political and 
judicial actors are currently considering various approaches to 
reform.349 State bad-faith patent-assertion laws may provide 
some protection for businesses, but likely not the breadth of 
protection desired by their proponents.350 Federal law would 
preempt many applications of the law, and perhaps those 
applications that state legislatures desired most.351 Normatively, 
preemption of state laws as applied is a solution well balanced to 
protect federal patent rights while allowing state legislatures and 
executives to take some action to protect small businesses from 
abusive business practices.352 The Vermont law and others like it 
                                                                                                     
 346. See Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 7 (1st Sess. 2013) (“Using 
existing resources, the Director shall develop educational resources for small 
businesses to address concerns arising from patent litigation.”). 
 347. See Wu, supra note 127 (arguing that the calculus underlying the PAE 
business model could be substantially frustrated if more patent-assertion 
complaints were directed to attorneys general). 
 348. See supra Part I (describing MPHJ’s demand-letter campaign).  
 349. See sources cited supra note 9 (listing pending federal reform bills); 
Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech 
Patent Issues, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-
issues (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (outlining the President’s reform initiative) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 350. See Landreth, supra note 11, at 125 (“Satisfying the bad-faith standard 
may not turn out to be a revolutionary change in the fight against patent 
trolls.”).  
 351. See supra Part VI.B.3 (identifying the provisions of the law argued to 
be preempted).  
 352. See supra Part VII (describing why state laws should be limitedly 
preempted).  
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can still serve a valuable function despite this finding of 
preemption, although that function is more symbolic than 
substantive.353  
  
                                                                                                     
 353. See supra Part VIII (describing the symbolic value of the law).  
